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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Regina Palmer filed a three-count complaint against her former employer, 
Oakland Farms, in the Western District of Virginia.1  Palmer alleged wrongful 
discharge from her position as a milker at Oakland Farms due to gender 
discrimination and retaliation for protected activity.2  Oakland Farms responded with 
an answer asserting eighteen affirmative defenses.3   
William Castillo filed a three-count complaint against his former employer, 
Roche Laboratories, in the Southern District of Florida.4  Castillo alleged that he was 
wrongfully terminated from Roche based on his sexual orientation.5  Roche 
countered with an answer including sixteen affirmative defenses.6   
                                                           
 1 Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10CV00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *1 (W.D. Va. 
June 24, 2010). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Castillo v. Roche Lab. Inc., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2010).  
 5 Id.  
 6 Id.    
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Roy Meas filed a four-count complaint against his former employer, CVS 
Pharmacy, in the Southern District of California.7   Meas alleged that he was not 
properly compensated under the Fair Labor Standards Act.8   Further, Meas claimed 
that he was wrongfully terminated from CVS after complaining about the alleged 
wage and hour violation.9   CVS filed an answer containing twenty-eight affirmative 
defenses.10   
These examples reveal what the federal courts already know—most answers 
contain a litany of affirmative defenses.11  These affirmative defenses are almost 
always merely listed in the answer with no supporting factual specificity.12  Many of 
the defenses are later found to be completely irrelevant to the case.13  The costly, 
time-consuming task of sifting through the typical “grocery list” of affirmative 
defenses to determine which, if any, have merit falls on both plaintiffs and the 
courts.14   
The plausibility standard is the remedy to the rampant pleading of meritless 
affirmative defenses in federal courts.  Set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly,15 
and later clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,16 the plausibility standard requires pleadings 
to contain sufficient factual allegations that give rise to a plausible claim for relief.17  
In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court used the plausibility approach to 
dismiss factually-deficient complaints.18  Applying the plausibility test to insufficient 
affirmative defenses produces the same result.19 
                                                           
 7 Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11CV0823 JM JMA, 2011 WL 2837432, at *2 (S.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2011).  
 8  Id.  
 9  Id.  
 10 Id at *1.  
 11 Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. CIVA 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“Defendants in this case, not unlike defendants in most answers 
received by this court, set forth a list of affirmative defenses to Plaintiff’s complaint.”). 
 12 Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (D. Minn. 2010). 
(“Affirmative defenses are almost always simply listed in answers; only rarely do defendants 
plead much in the way of facts in support of affirmative defenses.”). 
 13 See id.  (“In a typical case, it quickly becomes apparent that most of the affirmative 
defenses are not viable, and the parties simply ignore them.”). 
 14 See discussion infra Parts III.C.1., III.C.3. 
 15 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).   
 17 See discussion infra Parts II.D.3-4. 
 18 See discussion infra Parts II.D.3-4. 
 19 See, e.g., Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 232 (E.D.N.C. 2010) 
(striking eleven insufficient affirmative defenses analyzed under the plausibility standard); 
Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *8  (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) 
(striking six affirmative defenses analyzed under the plausibility standard); HCRI TRS 
Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (striking four insufficient 
affirmative defenses analyzed under the plausibility standard).      
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
234 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:231 
 
The central proposition of this Note is that federal courts should analyze 
affirmative defenses under the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard.  In order to 
provide context for this argument, it is first necessary to explain the process of 
pleading in the federal courts.  By examining the development and framework of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and discussing the historical and current state of 
the federal pleading standard, Part II of this Note is dedicated to this task.   
District courts are split on whether the plausibility standard should apply to 
affirmative defenses.20  Despite this divide, no Circuit Court of Appeals has directly 
ruled on this issue.21  Part III of this Note provides these courts with the pragmatic 
and textual reasons to support extending the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses in the future.   
II.  PLEADING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS  
Part II of this Note supplies an overview of the process of pleading under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules).  Part II.A. discusses the 
historical development of the Federal Rules.  Part II.B. explains the structure and 
purpose of Rule 8, the Federal Rule governing pleadings.  Part II.C. provides context 
for a discussion on dismissing insufficient complaints by examining Federal Rule 
12(b)(6).  Part II.D. examines the evolution of the federal pleading standard, 
including a detailed discussion on both the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.   
A.  Historical Development of the Federal Rules  
In 1911, the American Bar Association first promulgated a resolution requesting 
a uniform system of federal procedural rules.22  The resolution requested that the 
process of establishing the standardized system of civil rules be left to the Supreme 
Court.23  Congress granted the Supreme Court this authority in 1934 by passing the 
Enabling Act.24  The Enabling Act provided the Court with the authority to compose 
and promulgate federal rules of practice and procedure for civil cases.25  Congress 
                                                           
 20 Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (D. Kan. 2011) (asserting that 
“district courts are split” as to whether the plausibility standard applies to affirmative 
defenses); Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11CV0823 JM JMA, 2011 WL 2837432, at *2 
(S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (noting that “district courts are split” as to whether affirmative 
defenses should be analyzed under the Twombly-Iqbal standard); Dann v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 
274 F.R.D. 139 145 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“District courts across the country have disagreed as to 
whether Twombly’s plausibility standard has raised the bar for affirmative defenses.”).  
 21 Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 
1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010).   
 22 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1003 (3d ed. 
2002).  
 23 Id.    
 24 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509 (2d ed. 
1996).  
 25 Id. (discussing the power granted to the Supreme Court through the Enabling Act “to 
prescribe general rules governing the practice and procedure in civil cases in the federal 
courts.”). 
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reserved the right to reject, enact, or amend the federal rules once issued by the 
Court.26   
With the rule-making authority under the Enabling Act, the Court established a 
commission in 1935 to begin drafting the first set of federal civil procedural rules.27  
The authors were committed to developing procedures that would provide open 
access to the courts for all parties.28  
Without modification, Congress reported favorably on the Court’s first proposed 
federal rules of civil procedure in 1938.29  The Federal Rules came into effect on 
September 16, 1938.30  The Federal Rules were designed “to promote simplicity in 
procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”31  Commentators have characterized 
the Federal Rules as a significant victory for legal reform.32 
B.  Determining the Substantive Requirements of a Pleading—The Role of Rule 8 
One of the major changes implemented by the Federal Rules involved the 
process of pleading.33  Pleadings are considered “only those papers which set up a 
matter going to the merits of the controversy.”34  Wright & Miller’s treatise on 
federal civil practice opines that pleading serves four major functions: “(1) giving 
notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each party believes to 
exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for 
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”35   
Pleading under the Federal Rules is primarily governed by Rule 8.36  Rule 8(a) 
regulates pleading complaints, Rule 8(b) applies to the pleading of an answer, and 
Rule 8(c) controls the pleading of affirmative defenses.37 
                                                           
 26 Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 
1655, 1658 (1995). 
 27 Id.   
 28 Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the 
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989) (“The [Enabling 
Act] drafters' commitment was to a civil practice in which all parties would have ready access 
to the courts and to relevant information.”). 
 29 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1004.  
 30 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1004.    
 31 See McCabe, supra note 26, at 1656 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  
 32 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989). 
 33 Id. at 2238.   
 34 See 27 TRACY BATEMAN FARRELL ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYERS EDITION § 
62:6 (2008); see also DAVID F. HERR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 7:2.2 
(2011 ed.) (“Rule 7(a) recognizes only six pleadings—the complaint, the answer (including 
any counterclaims or cross-claims), a reply to a counterclaim, a reply to a cross-claim, a third-
party complaint, and an answer to a third-party complaint.”).  
 35 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1202 (quoting Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 
192 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 36 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
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The basic requirements for pleading under Rule 8 are textually similar between 
the relevant sections.  Rule 8(a)(2) mandates that a complaint contain a “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”38  Rule 
8(b)(1)(A) requires that an answer “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each 
claim asserted against it.”39  Rule 8(c)(1) dictates that to properly plead an 
affirmative defense in a responsive pleading a party must also “affirmatively state 
any avoidance or affirmative defense.”40   
C.  Challenging the Sufficiency of a Complaint—Rule 12(b)(6) 
Rule 12 describes the proper procedure for responding to a pleading.41  A Rule 
12(b)(6) motion is the vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of a complaint under 
Rule 8(a)(2).42  For purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, all factual allegations of the 
complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are construed in favor of 
the non-moving party.43  To succeed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the moving party 
must demonstrate that the complaint does not facially demonstrate a right to relief.44   
The Supreme Court’s standard for determining the factual detail necessary in a   
complaint to satisfy the language of Rule 8(a)(2) has evolved since the adoption of 
the Federal Rules.  The following discussion details this progression, culminating in 
an explanation of the current standard set forth in Iqbal.45   
D.  The Evolving Pleading Standard Under the Federal Rules 
Section D reviews the evolution of the federal pleading standard.  Section D.1. 
examines how the federal pleading standard transitioned from a technical approach 
to a more liberal standard following adoption of the Federal Rules.  Section D.2. 
details the Supreme Court’s confirmation of this liberal pleading standard in Conley 
v. Gibson.  Section D.3. describes the establishment of the plausibility standard in 
Twombly.  Section D.4. explores the definition of “plausibility” as clarified in Iqbal.   
1.  The Move Towards Functional Pleading 
Pleading prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules required a rigid, highly 
technical style.46  Common law rules dictating pleading standards demanded that a 
                                                           
 37 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)-(c). 
 38 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 39 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). 
 40 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 41 FED. R. CIV. P. 12.   
 42 DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 9.06 (5th ed. 2009). 
 43 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1357; see also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. 
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (reviewing the legal sufficiency of a 
complaint by “assum[ing] the truth of the material facts as alleged in the pleading”).  
 44 See HERR ET AL., supra note 42 (“[W]here a plaintiff's complaint is on its face legally 
hopeless, courts are quite happy to grant dismissal motions . . . .”).  
 45 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 662 (2007).  
 46 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2.3.  
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party detail each claim with supporting factual specificity.47  Failure to meet the 
mandated technical requirements often resulted in dismissal of the claim, regardless 
of the substantive merits of the case.48 
Compared to the strict, technical requirements of common law pleading, the 
Federal Rules provide a simplified approach.49  Under the Federal Rules, a claimant 
must only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief” in order to survive a motion to dismiss.50  This standard requires 
the plaintiff to simply inform “the defendant and the court of the general nature and 
basis of the claim.”51  By replacing the common law approach, the drafters of the 
Federal Rules sought to eliminate confusion and encourage flexibility when 
determining the sufficiency of a complaint.52   
2.  Seeking “Fair Notice”—Conley v. Gibson  
Courts were initially reluctant to accept the more liberal, simplified pleading 
standard of the Federal Rules.53  But the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in Conley v. 
Gibson54 clearly endorsed this more tolerant approach.55  Conley involved a claim 
brought by black union members alleging that their union engaged in discriminatory 
                                                           
 47 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2.3 (“Common law forms of pleading typically 
required a party to state with specificity the details of a claim and to conform to very 
technical, formalistic rules.”). 
 48 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2.3. 
 49 Nicholas Tymoczko, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility 
Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 
507 (2009); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434 
(2008) (“[T]he Federal Rules ushered in a simplified pleading system . . . .”).  
 50 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 
1944).   
 51 See Tymoczko, supra note 49, at 508.   
 52 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1216 (“The draftsmen of the federal rules 
obviously felt that the use of a new formulation would . . . encourage a more flexible approach 
by the courts in defining the concept of claim for relief.”). 
 53 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2.3; see also Spencer, supra note 49, at 435 
(“[T]here was early resistance among bench and bar to the simplified pleading system of the 
Federal Rules.”). 
 54 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 55 See Spencer, supra note 49, at 435; see also Alana C. Jochum, Pleading in Ohio After 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 501 (2010) 
(“The key case that defined the pleading standard at the federal level for half a century was 
Conley v. Gibson.”); Tymoczko, supra note 49, at 507 (“Conley v. Gibson endorsed the liberal 
ethos embodied by the Federal Rules, and, in doing so, gave substance to Rule 8.”); WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 22, § 1357 (“The test most often applied to determine the sufficiency of the 
complaint was set out in the leading case of Conley v. Gibson, decided in the formative years 
of the federal rules . . . .”).    
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practices.56  The union moved to dismiss the suit challenging that their members’ 
complaint did not adequately set forth a claim for which relief could be granted.57   
In denying the union’s motion, the Supreme Court set forth two laissez-faire 
prerequisites to satisfy the pleading dictates of Federal Rule 8(a)(2).  First, the Court 
asserted that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless 
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”58  Also, the Court avowed that “all the 
Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”59  
The Court termed this simplified approach “notice pleading.”60 
The Conley Court affirmed that the Federal Rules imposed only a notice-giving 
function to the statement of the claim component of the complaint.61  Under the 
notice pleading approach, a pleader must only provide “fair notice” to the opposing 
party of the claims or defenses.62  The pleader has no burden to recite the elements of 
a claim or the evidentiary facts necessary to prove those claims.63 A complaint 
asserted with sparse factual specificity would comply with the notice pleading 
approach as long as the defendant was adequately placed “on notice of the nature 
and grounds of [the] plaintiff’s claims.”64   
Through the Conley decision, the Supreme Court intended to quell any 
continuing resistance to the less formalistic pleading standards of the Federal 
Rules.65  For the next fifty years, the Supreme Court did not deviate from this liberal 
                                                           
 56 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42-43.   
 57 Id. at 45. 
 58 Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).  Some commentators have suggested that this famous 
language from the Conley decision was “arguably dicta.”  See Jochum, supra note 55, at 502 
n.47 (“The [Conley] Court actually reversed the case by holding that it was error for the lower 
courts to have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction . . . [t]here was no need for the 
Court to have reached the motion to dismiss issue, but the Court went on to consider the issue 
anyway.”). 
 59 Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. (emphasis added).   
 60 Id.   
 61 See Spencer, supra note 49, at 435. 
 62 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2; see also 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY RULE 8 (2009) (“Plaintiffs did not need to 
plead all of their facts or legal theories, but instead only needed to allege enough to give the 
defendant fair notice of what the claim was and the grounds upon which it rested.”). 
 63 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1216 
(“[T]he complaint, and other relief-claiming pleadings need not state with precision all of the 
elements that are necessary to give rise to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of 
the nature of the action is provided to the opposing party.”).    
 64 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 8:2 (“[E]ven a relatively bare bones complaint was 
considered sufficiently definite as long as it adequately put the defendant on notice of the 
nature and grounds of plaintiff's claim.”). 
 65 Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749, 1750 (1998).  
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approach to pleading.66  This was despite criticism from defendants that insufficient 
complaints too often survived a motion to dismiss.  These defendants claimed that 
they were frequently exposed to the costs and nuisance of the discovery process 
based on claims that were likely to fail at a later stage of the proceedings.67  
Addressing these concerns, the Supreme Court finally reevaluated the Conley 
standard in 2007 in Twombly.68 
3.  The Origin of the Plausibility Standard—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
Twombly involved a class action suit brought by William Twombly and 
Lawrence Marcus on behalf of all subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed 
internet services.69  The defendants were Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 
(ILECs), a system of regional telephone and internet service monopolies created 
following the divestiture of AT&T in 1984.70  Under a scheme devised by Congress 
in 1994, ILECs were obligated to share their network with competitors.71  These 
competitors were referred to as “Competitor Local Exchange Carriers” (CLECs).72   
The plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs violated the antitrust provisions of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.73  This contravention of the Sherman Act allegedly occurred in 
two ways.74  First, the Complaint charged that the ILECs “engaged in parallel 
conduct . . . to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs.”75  To support this claim, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the ILECs “ma[de] unfair agreements with the CLECs, . . . 
overcharg[ed], . . . and bill[ed] in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs relations 
with their own customers.”76  Second, the complaint asserted that the ILECs 
purposely failed to pursue business opportunities in “competitor” ILEC markets.77  
                                                           
 66 Spencer, supra note 49, at 436; see also HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 7:2.3 (“The Court 
had historically been fairly consistent in rebuffing attempts to impose more onerous pleading 
requirements.”); Michael R. Huston, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule 
Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 420 (2010) (“Conley's vision of notice pleading 
maintained its position as the standard interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) for five decades.”). 
 67 See HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 8:2 (“Defendants complained that where a complaint 
too easily survived a motion to dismiss, it subjected defendants to the inconvenience and 
expense of discovery on the basis of even visibly weak claims.”). 
 68 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
 69 Id. at 550. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) (prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations.”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
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Both actions allegedly led to inflated charges for local users of telephone and high-
speed Internet services.78   
The Southern District of New York dismissed the claim based on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief filed by the ILECs.79  The district court 
found that allegations of parallel business conduct alone do not suffice to state a 
valid claim under the Sherman Act.80  The court concluded that the ILECs individual 
interests in their own territories completely explained the “parallel conduct” of the 
local service providers.81   
Concluding that the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed.82  Citing the Conley standard, the Court of Appeals 
asserted that, to dismiss the complaint, the district court would have had to find that 
the plaintiffs could prove “no set of facts” demonstrating that the parallel conduct 
was not “mere coincidence.”83  According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs 
surpassed this “no set of facts” test.84   
Thus, the central issue before the Supreme Court in Twombly was what a plaintiff 
must plead in order to state a claim for relief under the Sherman Act.85  Responding 
to this question, the Court asserted that the plaintiff must provide sufficient factual 
detail in the complaint to demonstrate the “grounds” for relief under Rule 8(a)(2).86  
The Court stressed that demonstrating the grounds for relief requires more than 
pleading “labels and conclusions” and a “recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action.”87  The Court emphasized that factual support in a complaint was needed so 
the plaintiff can meet the Conley burden of providing “fair notice” of the nature of 
the claim.88   
The Court articulated that the plaintiff must not only provide factually supported 
allegations, but the factual allegations must support a right to relief that is more than 
merely speculative.89  Thus, the factual allegations in the complaint must rise to the 
                                                           
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 552 (citing Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 1799 (S.D. N.Y. 
2003)). 
 80 Id.   
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.2d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]o 
survive a motion to dismiss . . . a court would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that 
would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product 
of collusion rather than coincidence.”). 
 84 Id.   
 85 Id. at 554. 
 86 Id. at 555. 
 87 Id. at 555. 
 88 Id. at 556 n.3. 
 89 Id. at 555. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/9
2013] SOLVING A PLEADING PLAGUE 241 
 
“plausible level” in order to meet the dictates of Rule 8(a)(2).90  Under this 
plausibility standard, a plaintiff’s claim would not survive a motion to dismiss if the 
factual allegations suggest an illegal activity but equally suggest another harmless 
explanation.91  The Court avowed that the plausibility approach should not be 
considered a heightened pleading standard.92 
The Court specified that the plausibility standard does not require a plaintiff to 
plead facts that demonstrate relief is “probably” entitled.93  In the antitrust context, a 
plaintiff would only need to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery 
would reasonably lead to evidence of illegal conspiracy between the parties.94  The 
Twombly plaintiffs’ bare allegations of parallel conduct, without any factual bases 
that supported an illegal conspiracy, did not meet this standard.95  
The Court recognized that the Conley “no set of facts” standard could not coexist 
with the plausibility standard.96  Under the Conley standard, a literal reading of “no 
set of facts” meant that a plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss by pleading 
nothing more than completely conclusory allegations in the complaint.97  The 
Twombly Court was unambiguous in its effort to banish the Conley standard.98  The 
Court asserted that the “no set of facts” language had “earned its retirement” and was 
“best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”99   
Pragmatic concerns regarding the costs of discovery provided the Court’s 
justification for the creation of the plausibility standard.100  The Court asserted that 
wholly insufficient claims should be disposed of at the pleading stage due to the 
“costs of modern federal litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts . 
. . .”101  The Court cautioned that defendants may choose to settle weak claims before 
                                                           
 90 Id. at 556; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1357 (“[T]he Court in Twombly 
created a new factual plausibility standard by requiring facts that ‘raise the right to relief 
above the speculative level’ to the plausible level . . . .”). 
 91 See Spencer, supra note 49, at 436 (“[A] plaintiff may no longer survive a motion to 
dismiss if she pleads facts that are equivocal, meaning the allegations are consistent both with 
the asserted illegality and with an innocent alternate explanation.”). 
 92 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also GENSLER, supra note 62 (“[N]othing in Bell Atlantic 
suggests a return to fact pleading or that pleaders must now plead all of their facts.  Notice 
pleading remains the norm.”).  
 93 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
 94 Id. at 556. 
 95 Id. at 564-71. 
 96 Id. at 563.  
 97 Id. at 561 (“On . . . a focused and literal reading of Conley's ‘no set of facts,’ a wholly 
conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss . . . .”). 
 98 Id. at 563. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 557-59. 
 101 Id. at 558 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 
1984); see also HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (N.D. Ohio 
2010) (“[T]he holdings of Twombly and Iqbal were designed to eliminate the potential high 
costs of discovery associated with meritless claims.”).   
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being subjected to the costly process of discovery if courts wait to dismiss 
insufficient claims during summary judgment.102 
Following Twombly, two central questions emerged.  First, uncertainty existed as 
to whether the plausibility standard extended to all cases or only to cases dealing 
with antritrust law.103  In addition, Twombly left an unclear definition of 
“plausibility.”104  In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed, and answered, both of these 
questions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.105 
4.  The Meaning of “Plausibility”—Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Iqbal involved a Bivens action originally filed against over thirty federal officials 
in the Eastern District of New York.106  Two of the named defendants were Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert 
Mueller.107  The allegations against these two high-level officials were the only 
relevant allegations before the Supreme Court.108  
 The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was arrested following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in New York City.109  Iqbal’s arrest was related to an expansive 
Department of Justice investigation following the attacks.110  The FBI interviewed 
over 1,000 individuals with suspected ties to the attacks or links to terrorism.111  The 
FBI detained 184 of these individuals as persons of “high interest.”112  These subjects 
were held in highly restrictive conditions.113  Iqbal was one of these detainees.114   
Following his release from custody, Iqbal filed the action against Mueller and 
Ashcroft.115  The complaint alleged that Iqbal and “thousands of other Arab Muslim 
                                                           
 102 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (recognizing that the plausibility standard is necessary to 
avoid “cost-conscious defendants” from settling even “anemic cases”). 
 103 See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
477 (2010) (“One approach has been to argue that the requirement of plausibility is best 
understood as an aspect of substantive antitrust law.”). 
 104 Tymoczko, supra note 49, at 513 (“Widespread confusion followed in the wake of 
Twombly.  Courts and commentators alike struggled to determine the applicability and 
meaning of the plausibility standard and its relation to notice pleading.”); see GENSLER, supra 
note 62 (“One of the mysteries of Bell Atlantic was what the court meant when it used the 
phrase “a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”); see also HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 
7:2.3 (asserting that the Twombly Court’s plausibility standard “is a somewhat murky test”). 
 105 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1937 (2009).   
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 1944. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 1943. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id.  
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men” were subjected to the harsh conditions of confinement “on account of [their] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”116  
Iqbal articulated in his complaint that Ashcroft and Mueller “each knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” the Arab men to the 
discriminatory policy.117   
The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in the district court alleging that the 
complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate their involvement in unconstitutional 
conduct.118  Applying the Conley “no set of facts” standard, the district court denied 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Reasoning that the substantive issues did not 
require the “amplification” of plausibility pleading, the Appeals Court affirmed.119   
The high-profile case landed in the Supreme Court.  Before analyzing Iqbal’s 
claim, the Supreme Court explained a two-pronged approach to use to assess 
whether a complaint should withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.120  First, courts should 
identify and dismiss pleadings containing merely conclusory allegations without any 
factual support.121  The Court reiterated that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not sufficient to meet 
the Twombly standard.122  These unsubstantiated claims are not entitled to a 
presumption of truth upon challenge from a 12(b)(6) motion.123  Reflecting the 
policy arguments underlying Twombly, the Court asserted that defendants should not 
be able to expose defendants to the costly process of discovery with nothing more 
than conclusory allegations.124 
The second prong requires courts to recognize those pleadings that are supported 
by sufficient factual allegations.125  For these pleadings, courts should consider all 
facts as true and then determine whether the facts plausibly give rise to a claim for 
relief.126  To be considered “plausible,” the facts in the complaint must permit the 
court to infer more than a possibility of wrongdoing.127  Courts should dismiss 
pleadings that do not plausibly grant a right to relief before permitting discovery on 
                                                           
 116 Id. at 1944. 
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. at 1949-50. 
 121 Id. at 1950. 
 122 Id. at 1949. 
 123 Id. at 1950. 
 124 Id. (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”). 
 125 Id. at 1950. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
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factually-deficient claims.128  This assessment requires a court to “draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.”129  
Iqbal’s claim failed under this two-part test.130  The Court found that the 
allegation that Mueller and Ashcroft conspired to subject the detainees to harsh 
confinement simply based on their “religion, race, and/or national origin” was 
nothing more than a conclusory recitation of the elements of a discrimination 
claim.131  This allegation failed the first prong of the two-part test because it 
contained no supporting factual detail.132   
The claims that were supported with facts were also found to be insufficient 
under the second prong of the plausibility test.133  For purposes of this analysis, the 
Court accepted as true the factual allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller approved a 
policy that led to the post-September 11th detention of thousands of Arab men.134  
But the Court deemed Iqbal’s discrimination claim not plausible because the 
complainants were more likely detained for lawful reasons, such as their connection 
to terrorism, than the discriminatory reasons set forth by Iqbal.135  Thus, the Court 
deemed Iqbal’s entire complaint insufficient and subject to Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal.136 
By ruling on the merits of Iqbal’s claim, the Court silenced any argument that the 
Twombly standard was limited to antitrust cases.  The Court specifically addressed 
this argument by asserting that “[o]ur decision in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for all ‘civil actions”’ and further proclaiming that “the [Twombly] decision 
was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8.”137   
III.  THE CASE FOR EXTENDING TWOMBLY AND IQBAL TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Part III explains the central proposal of this Note—why the plausibility standard 
should apply to affirmative defenses.  The first three sections provide needed context 
for this discussion.  Part III.A. examines the pleading of affirmative defenses under 
Rule 8(c).  Part III.B. surveys the process of striking an insufficient affirmative 
                                                           
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 1951. 
 131 Id. (“These bare assertions . . . amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of 
the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 1951-52. 
 134 Id. at 1951. 
 135 Id. at 1951-52 (“It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks 
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of 
the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”). 
 136 Id. at 1952. 
 137 Id. at 1953; see also Hartnett, supra note 103, at 479 (“[T]his attempt to limit the scope 
of Twombly [to antitrust cases] has failed. Indeed, it did not attract a single vote on the 
Supreme Court in the Iqbal case.”). 
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defense under Rule 12(f).  Part III.C. reviews the widespread abuse of pleading 
insufficient affirmative defenses in federal courts.   
The remaining sections present the principal arguments of this Note.  Part III.D. 
evaluates the pragmatic justifications for applying the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses.  Part III.E. refutes the formalistic arguments typically advanced 
by those challenging a claim that an affirmative defense should meet the plausibility 
standard.   
A.  Pleading Affirmative Defenses—Rule 8(c) 
Affirmative defenses are governed by Rule 8(c).138  Affirmative defenses provide 
a basis for avoiding judgment in favor of the plaintiff without refuting the elements 
of the claim.139  Rule 8(c) provides an illustrative list of nineteen common 
affirmative defenses.140  Failure to plead an affirmative defense in the answer may 
result in waiver of that defense.141  However, the defendant is typically permitted to 
amend the answer to add any affirmative defenses not initially raised in the original 
response.142   
B.  Striking Insufficient Affirmative Defenses—Rule 12(f) 
A court may strike an affirmative defense as a matter of law under Rule 12(f) if 
the defense is “insufficient.”143  Similar to Rule 8, a defense is insufficiently pled if it 
fails to provide “fair notice” to the plaintiff of the nature of the defense.144  An 
affirmative defense meets the fair notice standard when it contains enough factual 
detail that the plaintiff is “not a victim of unfair surprise.”145  A plaintiff claiming 
that an affirmative defense does not meet this standard must move to strike the 
insufficient defense within twenty-one days of receipt of the answer.146   
By striking defenses at the pleading stage that are certain to fail at a later phase 
of the proceedings, Rule 12(f) motions avoid the time-consuming, costly process of 
discovery on meritless claims.147  Despite this valuable purpose, federal courts do not 
                                                           
 138 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 139 GENSLER, supra note 62.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) 
(defenses that negate the elements of a plaintiff’s claim).   
 140 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 141 HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 9:2. 
 142 FED. R. CIV. P. 15; see also HERR ET AL., supra note 34, § 9:2 (explaining the process of 
adding affirmative defenses to the answer through amendment). 
 143 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (Rule 12(f) also provides the ability to strike “redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”).   
 144 Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan Non-Bargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 
1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010).   
 145 Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. CIV A 05-CV-
0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. 
Matthews, 998 F.2d 305, 309 (5th Cir.1993)).  
 146 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)(2). 
 147 See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (“The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid 
spending time and money litigating spurious issues.”). 
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favor striking affirmative defenses.148  Courts view striking an affirmative defense 
under a Rule 12(f) motion as a “drastic remedy.”149  Courts that restrict the use of 
Rule 12(f) motions often cite the effect of the motions on judicial resources.150  In 
addition, courts disfavor Rule 12(f) motions because they can be used to delay the 
litigation process.151   
 Despite the motions being disfavored, courts still have “liberal discretion” to 
strike insufficient defenses under Rule 12(f).152  Defendants are typically provided 
leave to amend any affirmative defense struck by a Rule 12(f) motion.153   
C.  “Hooks Without Bait”—The Widespread Abuse of Pleading Insufficient 
Affirmative Defenses in Federal Courts  
Before addressing why affirmative defenses should be limited by the plausibility 
standard, it is first necessary to recognize the “widespread abuse” of Rule 8(c) 
defenses in federal courts.154  Most answers contain a litany of Rule 8(c) defenses.155  
                                                           
 148 United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 6, 2007) (“[Rule 12] motions are ‘generally regarded’ with disfavor because of the 
limited importance of pleading in federal practice . . . .”); Stoffels, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 
(“Motions to strike are . . . disfavored and infrequently granted.”).   
 149 Harris v. USA Ins. Cos., No. CIV.A. 11 201, 2011 WL 3841869, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 
30, 2011). 
 150 Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11CV0823 JM JMA, 2011 WL 2837432, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2011) (“[A] heightened pleading standard [for affirmative defenses] may require 
the court to address multiple motions to amend the answer as discovery reveals additional 
defenses.”); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (“[S]everal courts have characterized such motions as ‘time 
wasters.’”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011) (“[M]otions to strike, in most 
cases, waste everyone’s time.”).   
 151 See Jeeper's of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enter., L.L.C., No. 10-13682, 2011 WL 1899195, 
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) (quoting Quadrini, 2007 WL 4303213, at *3) (“[Rule 12(f)] 
motions are generally regarded with disfavor because . . . they are often used as a delaying 
tactic.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC, No. CIV. 09-1204 
JBS/JS, 2011 WL 883202, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. 
v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001)) (explaining that Rule 12(f) motions are 
disfavored because they are often used as a ‘dilatory tactic.’”).   
 152 Jeeper’s, 2011 WL 1899195, at *1; see also Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 
F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009) (“The decision to strike an affirmative defense is within the 
sound discretion of the district court.”). 
 153 Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., No. 08-CV-335-JPS, 2008 WL 4443805, at *2 
(W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“[D]efendant can amend its affirmative defenses as a ‘matter of 
course’ pursuant to Rule 15.”); see also Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan Non-Bargained 
Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (permitting amendment of thirteen 
insufficiently pled affirmative defenses); Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 652 (“The majority of cases 
applying the Twombly pleading standard to affirmative defenses . . . have permitted the 
defendant leave to amend.”). 
 154 Quadrini, 2007 WL 4303213, at *6.   
 155 Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. CIVA 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“Defendant in this case, not unlike defendants in most answers 
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In most of these cases, the affirmative defenses are completely irrelevant and ignored 
by all parties.156  Some of these defenses are not even related to the plaintiff’s case.157  
Almost all affirmative defenses are pled with no supporting factual detail.158  Courts 
have equated this technique of pleading a rote list of insufficient affirmative defenses 
to “tossing . . . a fish hook without bait.”159  
D.  Practical Reasons for Extending the Plausibility Standard to Affirmative 
Defenses  
Section D presents the pragmatic reasons for extending the plausibility standard 
to affirmative defenses. Section D.1. explains that unneeded discovery costs for 
plaintiffs could be limited by applying the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses.  Section D.2. illustrates that the actual purpose of discovery is best served 
by applying plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses.  Section D.3. describes the 
positive impact on judicial economics realized by extending the Twombly-Iqbal 
standard to affirmative defenses.  Section D.4. discusses extending the plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses out of concern for maintaining fairness between 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
1.  Analyzing Affirmative Defenses Under the Plausibility Standard Saves Plaintiffs 
from Unnecessary Discovery Costs 
The same policy concern central to the Twombly and Iqbal courts in 
implementing the plausibility standard for complaints justifies applying the same 
standard to affirmative defenses.  Both Twombly and Iqbal suggested that the costs 
of developing cases during discovery was a sufficient reason to require plausibility 
pleading.160  Unsupported, “boilerplate” affirmative defenses have the same negative 
impact on litigation costs as insufficiently pled complaints.161   
                                                           
received by this court, set forth a list of affirmative defenses to Plaintiff's complaint.”); Lane, 
272 F.R.D. at 596 (“[C]ounsel often plead vast numbers of affirmative defenses . . . .”). 
 156 Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Minn. 2010) (“In a 
typical case, it quickly becomes apparent that most of the affirmative defenses are not viable, 
and the parties simply ignore them.”). 
 157 See, e.g., Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 648 (recognizing a completely non-applicable product 
liability affirmative defense); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 
(N.D. Ohio) (identifying an affirmative defense that made “no sense” in the context of the 
case). 
 158 Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (“[T]he content of defendant’s 
answer is not unlike many others this court sees.  Without factual detail, defendant asserts 
several affirmative defenses . . . .”); see also Shinew v. Wszola, No. CIV.A. 08-14256, 2009 
WL 1076279, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009) (asserting that the defendant pled a “grocery 
list” of affirmative defenses “with no effort to state facts which might support them.”). 
 159 Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 651.  
 
 160 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557-79 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1950; James E. von der Heydt, Ripple Effects: The Unintended Change to 
Jurisdictional Pleading Standards After Iqbal, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799, 817 (2012) (“The 
goal in each case was to protect preoccupied defendants from expensive fact finding . . . .”).  
 
 161 HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also Nixson v. The Health 
Alliance, No. 1:10-CV-00338, 2010 WL 5230867, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2010) 
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Without the limitations imposed by plausibility pleading, plaintiffs are left to file 
interrogatories, take depositions, and request documents in an attempt to determine 
which affirmative defenses actually have merit.162  This “shot in the dark” discovery 
technique raises the overall costs of litigation—the exact pragmatic concern 
addressed in Twombly and Iqbal. 
Evaluating the actual costs of discovery in a federal civil suit reveals the 
necessity of applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.  The litigation 
costs in a “typical” federal civil suit were recently estimated at nearly $15,000 for 
plaintiffs.163  Cases involving e-discovery or large corporations can result in 
discovery expenses far exceeding these numbers.164  Discovery involving e-data can 
average costs of “tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars” in even average cases.165  
Further, more complex cases involving large corporations can average $700,000 in 
discovery costs per case.166  A plaintiff may fail to bring a meritorious case when 
faced with these types of exorbitant costs during litigation.167  In addition, excessive 
discovery expenditures can also be used as a “tool to force settlement.”168   
Applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses at the pleading stage 
would allow plaintiffs to avoid the costly discovery process on meritless affirmative 
defenses.  Requiring affirmative defenses to satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal test would 
permit courts to “weed out” meritless affirmative defenses before proceeding to 
unnecessary, costly discovery.169  Limiting needless discovery costs through 
                                                           
(“[B]oilerplate [affirmative defenses] can lead to the same costly effect on litigation as 
inadequate complaints.”). 
    162  Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008); see also Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan Non-Bargained 
Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (recognizing that responding to 
insufficiently pled affirmative defenses would require the plaintiff to “conduct expensive and 
potentially unnecessary and irrelevant discovery.”). 
    163 See WILLIAM H. HUBBARD, THE COSTS AND BURDENS OF CIVIL DISCOVERY 4 (Dec. 13, 
2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/12132011Hubbard.pdf. 
 164 See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot be Optimal but Could be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 894 (2009). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See HUBBARD, supra note 163, at 5.  
 167 AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYER’S TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=4008. 
 168 AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYER’S TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM A-4 (Aug. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentD
isplay.cfm&ContentID=3650 (citing an attorney survey in which 71% of respondents 
indicated that discovery can be used to force a settlement).  
 169 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 08-81536-CIV, 
2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009). 
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application of the two-part Twombly-Iqbal test is increasingly important “due to the 
growing tendency to assert . . . boilerplate defenses.”170   
2.  The Purpose of the Discovery Process is Best Served by Striking Insufficient 
Affirmative Defenses During Pleading 
As discussed in the preceding section, without the ability to analyze 
insufficiently pled affirmative defenses under the plausibility standard, plaintiffs are 
left to use the costly channels of discovery to determine whether the defenses have 
any merit.171  Some courts are content with this process, claiming that plaintiffs have 
“ample opportunity” during discovery to determine which affirmative defenses have 
merit.172   
These courts fail to recognize that the purpose of discovery is not to discover the 
“bare minimum facts” of a claim or defense.173  The intended function of discovery 
is to “find out additional facts about a well-pleaded claim, not to find out whether 
such a claim exists.”174  The typical affirmative defense does not meet this “well-
pleaded” standard.  Thus, the actual function of discovery is safeguarded by 
analyzing and striking insufficient affirmative defenses under the two-part Twombly-
Iqbal test during pleading.175  Applying the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses not only limits unneeded discovery costs for plaintiffs, but also better 
effectuates the true purpose of discovery in the federal courts. 
3.  Requiring Defendants to Plead with Factual Specificity Reduces Court Delay 
The current “logjam” in the federal courts has led to some civil litigants “waiting 
years for their day in court.”176  Adopting the Twombly-Iqbal standard for affirmative 
defenses aids in alleviating the overburdened federal dockets by eliminating 
meritless issues at the earliest possible stage of the case.177  
                                                           
 170 Castillo v. Roche Lab. Inc., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2010). 
 171 See discussion supra Part III.D.1. 
 172 Ash Grove Cement Co. v. MMR Constructors, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-04069, 2011 WL 
3811445, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2011). 
 173 Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. May 29, 2008).    
 174 Id. (quoting Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (emphasis added).   
 175 Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10CV00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D. Va. 
June 24, 2010) (“[B]y applying the Twombly-Iqbal  standard . . . to affirmative defenses, a 
plaintiff . . . [can] use the discovery process for its intended purpose of ascertaining the 
additions facts which support a well-pleaded claim or defense.”). 
 176 Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Case Glut Impedes Civil Suits, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 10, 2011.   
 177 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 08-81536-CIV, 
2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (recognizing the importance of eliminating 
insufficient defenses at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings). 
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The Twombly Court recognized the increasing caseload demands on the federal 
courts in adopting the plausibility approach for complaints.178  Insufficiently pled 
affirmative defenses have the same detrimental effect on federal dockets as the 
factually-deficient complaint addressed in Twombly.179  Unsupported, irrelevant 
affirmative defenses do nothing more than “clutter” federal dockets.180  Courts often 
waste time dealing with factually-deficient affirmative defenses by being forced to 
identify the relevant issues through summary judgment motions and pretrial 
conferences.181  Requiring affirmative defenses to be factually plausible removes the 
courts from this time-consuming role.  Additionally, extending the plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses would restrict defendants from delaying the entire 
litigation process by dragging out discovery on non-viable defenses.182   
Thus, adopting the Twombly-Iqbal standard for affirmative defenses would both 
reduce the time courts spend in response to meritless affirmative defenses and 
decrease the overall length of time needed by the parties for discovery.  Applying the 
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses is one step that courts could take to 
remedy the backlog of cases in the federal system.    
Not all courts recognize that applying the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative 
defenses would lead to more efficient court operations.  Courts that have refused to 
strike insufficient affirmative defenses under the plausibility standard often cite the 
“disfavored” nature of Rule 12(f) motions to justify this decision.183  Rule 12(f) 
motions are considered disfavored because of their potential to waste “judicial 
resources.”184  The central concern of these courts is that applying the plausibility 
                                                           
 178 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557-79 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he . . . increasing caseload 
of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery when there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the 
complaint.”)). 
 179 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008) (recognizing that the common practice of pleading unsupported, 
irrelevant affirmative defenses “create[s] unnecessary work” for the courts). 
 180 Id.   
 181 Castillo v. Roche Lab. Inc., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2010). 
 182 See Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (quoting First 
Specialty Ins. Corp. v. GRS Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 08-81356-CIV-MARRA, 2009 WL 
2169869, *2 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2009)) (“[W]eeding out legally insufficient defenses at an 
early stage . . . may be extremely valuable . . . in order to avoid the needless expenditures of 
time and money in litigating issues which can be seen to have no bearing on the outcome.”).   
 183 Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11CV0823 JM JMA, 2011 WL 2837432, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2011); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D. N.M. 2011); Tyco Fire Prods. LP 
v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 184 Greenheck Fan Corp., 2008 WL 4443805, at *1; Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 
07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (citation omitted) 
(“Motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are disfavored, and several courts have characterized 
such motions as ‘time wasters.”’); Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 596 (“Motions to dismiss help resolve 
cases; motions to strike, in most cases, waste everyone’s time.”). 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/9
2013] SOLVING A PLEADING PLAGUE 251 
 
standard to affirmative defenses would result in a significant increase in the number 
of Rule 12(f) motions filed by plaintiffs.185   
This narrow argument against applying the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses fails to recognize the utility of Rule 12(f) motions in the context of striking 
insufficient affirmative defenses.  The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to “avoid 
spending time and money litigating spurious issues.”186  Using a Rule 12(f) motion to 
strike an insufficient affirmative defense accomplishes this goal by eliminating 
meritless issues prior to discovery and trial.187  In this role, the Rule 12(f) motion is 
not used to delay or waste the court’s time—it is merely used as a mechanism to 
expedite discovery and to spare judicial resources.188  
While adopting the plausibility standard for affirmative defenses could increase 
the number of Rule 12(f) motions, the expectation would be that defendants would 
adjust to the procedural change.  This adaptation would include defendants either 
pleading affirmative defenses with factual specificity or failing to plead the defenses 
completely.  In this scenario, Rule 12(f) motions would not increase because the 
defendants would recognize their proper burden under plausibility pleading.  Even if 
Rule 12(f) motions did increase, the detrimental effect on judicial resources is 
arguably counterbalanced by both the time saved during discovery and the reduction 
of summary judgment motions on spurious issues.189  
4.  Extending the Plausibility Standard to Affirmative Defenses Maintains Fairness 
in Pleading Between Plaintiffs and Defendants 
Applying the plausibility standard solely to complaints, and not to affirmative 
defenses, unfairly favors defendants.190  If affirmative defenses are not forced to 
meet the Twombly-Iqbal test, plaintiffs must adhere to a more stringent pleading 
standard than their adversaries.191  This contrast makes little sense when the goal of 
                                                           
 185  See Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 596; see also Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 901 
(“[R]equiring more detailed defensive pleading will inevitably lead plaintiffs to file more 
motions to strike.”). 
 186 Bottoni v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. C 10-03602 LB, 2011 WL 3678878, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2011).   
 187 Jeeper's of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enter., L.L.C., No. 10-13682, 2011 WL 1899195, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Thorn, No. 2:01-CV-290, 
2002 WL 31412440, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2002)) (recognizing that a Rule 12(f) motion 
is proper “if it aids in eliminating spurious issues before trial, thereby streamlining the 
litigation.”).   
 188 See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“But where . . . motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from the case, they serve to 
expedite, not delay.”). 
 189 See id.    
 190 Topline Solutions, Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836, at *1 
(D. Md. July 27, 2010).    
 191 See id. (“[I]t would be incongruous and unfair to require a plaintiff to operate under one 
standard and to permit the defendant to operate under a different, less stringent standard.”). 
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both complaints and affirmative defenses is to provide the opposing party with “fair 
notice” of the nature of the claim or defense.192   
Some courts assert that requiring different pleading standards is not unfair 
because the the statute of limitations is the only time limitation plaintiffs have in 
preparing the complaint.193  This is different for defendants who, under Rule 12, 
typically only have twenty-one days to develop the facts required to file an answer in 
response to a complaint.194  Several courts that rejected plausibility pleading for 
affirmative defenses claimed that it would be “unrealistic” to expect defendants to 
investigate and file factually-sufficient affirmative defenses within twenty-one 
days.195  For these courts, pleading a rote list of affirmative defenses protects the 
defendant from the risk of waiving affirmative defenses that could factually develop 
during discovery.196  
But this argument fails to take into account that defendants have the ability to 
amend the answer under Rule 15.197  Courts have freely granted amendment in most 
cases where affirmative defenses were struck for failing to meet the Twombly-Iqbal 
standard.198  Also, defendants, without hardship, can amend the answer to add 
                                                           
 192 See Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“Twombly's rationale of giving fair notice to the opposing party would seem to apply as well 
to affirmative defenses given the purpose of Rule 8(b)'s requirements for defenses.”); Palmer 
v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10CV00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 
2010) (“[I]t neither makes sense nor is it fair to require a plaintiff to provide the defendant 
with enough notice that there is a plausible, factual basis for  [his] claim under one pleading 
standard and then permit the defendant under another pleading standard simply to suggest that 
some defense may possibly apply in the case.”); Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 4:10–cv–
00582–DGK, 2011 WL 1364075, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011) (“It makes little sense to 
hold defendants to a lower pleading standard than plaintiffs when, ‘in both instances, the 
purpose of pleading requirements is to is to prove enough notice to the opposing party . . . .’”). 
 193 Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D. N.M. 2011) (“Because a plaintiff can do a lot of 
pre-filing work, and a defendant generally cannot, there is a sound rationale for requiring 
more of plaintiffs than of defendants at the pleading stage.”); Wells Fargo & Co v. United 
States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 (“[P]laintiffs and defendants are in much different 
positions” because “a plaintiff has months—often years—to investigate a claim before 
pleading that claim in federal court.”) (emphasis in original). 
 194 See Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) 
(recognizing that defendants only “have a short amount of time to develop the facts 
necessary” to answer a complaint); Adams v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:11-CV-
337-J-37MCR, 2011 WL 2938467, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2011) (“Whereas plaintiffs have 
the opportunity to conduct investigations prior to filing their complaints, defendants, who 
typically only have twenty-one days to respond to the complaint, do not have such a luxury.”).  
 195 Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11CV0823 JM JMA, 2011 WL 2837432, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2011) (“To expect a defendant to investigate and to adequately prepare an 
answer containing all relevant affirmative defenses within 21 days of service of the complaint 
. . . would seem to be unrealistic . . . .”). 
 196 See Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 596 (recognizing that defendants often plead numerous 
affirmative defenses so that the defense is preserved if discovery reveals factual support).  
 197 FED. R. CIV. P. 15.  
 198 Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Kan. 2009); see, e.g., 
Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. C 10-945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
May 16, 2012) (striking five affirmative defenses and granting the defendant fourteen days to 
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defenses realized during discovery because only a few defenses are waived if not 
asserted immediately.199  There is no legitimate reason then for defendants to 
“window-dress” the answer by pleading a “grocery list” of affirmative defenses 
during the early stage of the proceedings.200  Openly permitting leave to amend the 
answer greatly reduces any adverse effects to defendants of applying the plausibility 
standard to affirmative defenses.201  
In addition, although defendants only have twenty-one days to prepare the initial 
answer, pleading sufficient facts to satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal standard is not 
demanding.  A defendant does not need to plead all possible relevant facts in order to 
satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal two-part test.202  The affirmative defense can still be pled 
“simply and briefly.”203  The defendant need only provide enough factual detail that 
plausibly suggests a valid defense.204   
Applying the plausibility standard to complaints and not to affirmative defenses 
is unfair to plaintiffs.  The different time restrictions for plaintiffs and defendants 
during pleading do not justify this disparate treatment.   
E.  Failing to Apply the Plausibility Standard to Affirmative Defenses is Not 
Warranted by Formalistic Concerns  
Courts refusing to apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses 
typically justify this decision based on formalistic arguments.  These courts claim 
that applying the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses favors “pragmatic 
considerations rather than textual dictates.”205   
Section E identifies, examines, and disputes these formalistic arguments.  Section 
E.1. explains that even a strict reading of Twombly and Iqbal permits applying 
plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses.  Section E.2. refutes any argument that 
                                                           
amend the answer); Trading Techs. Int'l Inc. v. CQG, No. 05 C 4811, 2012 WL 5383199, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2012) (striking two affirmative defenses and granting the defendant 
twenty-one days to amend the answer); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained 
Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking nineteen insufficient 
affirmative defenses and granting the defendant thirty days to amend the answer); Holtzman, 
2008 WL 2225668, at *2 (striking nine insufficient affirmative defenses and granting the 
defendant ten days to amend the answer); Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10CV00029, 
2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (striking eleven insufficient affirmative 
defenses and granting twenty days to amend the answer); Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 
270 F.R.D. 228, 232 (striking eleven insufficient affirmative defenses and granting fourteen 
days to amend the answer).    
 199 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008).  
 200 Id.  
 201 See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09CV737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
July 29, 2010) (“[T]he flexibility of amendment softens any painful blow of heightened 
pleading standards.”). 
 202 Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179 at *5.   
 203 Id.  
 204 Id.  
 205 Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 591. 
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the text of the Federal Rules does not support requiring factually supported pleading 
for affirmative defenses.  Section E.3. discusses the historical authority that supports 
extending the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. 
1.  The Twombly and Iqbal Opinions Enable Extending Plausibility Pleading to 
Affirmative Defenses   
Courts often justify refusing to apply the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses by alleging that the Twombly and Iqbal opinions only referenced the 
pleading of complaints.206  Espousing a narrow approach, these courts reject Rule 
12(f) motions filed in response to factually-deficient answers because neither 
opinion expressly referenced affirmative defenses.207   
But, even if textualism is paramount as these courts claim, the language used in 
both Twombly and Iqbal does lend itself to applying the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses.  Instead of using the word “complaint” to describe the extent of 
the plausibility standard, both the Twombly and Iqbal courts used the word 
“pleading” to discuss the reach of the plausibility standard.  For example, the 
Twombly Court asserted that “a district court must retain the power to insist upon 
some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual 
controversy to proceed.”208  Similarly, the Iqbal Court stated that “pleadings [which] 
. . . are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”209  
Thus, even though Twombly and Iqbal did not explicitly recognize affirmative 
defenses, the language of both opinions does textually permit applying the 
plausibility standard to these pleadings.   
2.  The Federal Rules Indicate that Claims and Defenses Should be Held to the Same 
Pleading Standard  
Other courts that deny applying plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses 
based on textual grounds often cite the differing language in the Federal Rules for 
complaints and defenses.210  These courts highlight that Twombly and Iqbal both 
                                                           
 206 See, e.g., Sewell v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 32209, at *7 
(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) (“Because Twombly and Iqbal do not expressly apply to defenses . . 
. this Court declines to do so.”); Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. CIVA 09-973, 
2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly was 
interpreting pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) . . . and declines to so extend the Supreme 
Court ruling as requested by [the] Plaintiff.”). 
 207 Romantine, 2009 WL 341769, at *1; see also McLemore v. Regions Bank, No. 3:08-
CV-0021, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (denying a Rule 12(f) 
motion because “the [Twombly] opinion does not mention affirmative defenses” and “Iqbal 
also focused exclusively on the pleading burden that applies to plaintffs’ complaints.”).    
 208 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528, n.17 (1983)) (emphasis added). 
    209 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1953 
(“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions . . . .”).   
 210 See Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 592 (“Courts that have refused to extend the pleading standard 
to affirmative defenses . . . have generally found more support in the text of the rules . . . .”).  
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only interpreted Rule 8(a), which solely applies to complaints.211  A careful 
examination of the text of Rule 8 is required to understand, and refute, this argument.  
Defenses are generally governed by Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules.  Under Rule 
8(b), a defendant must “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim 
asserted against it . . . .”212  Rule 8(c) requires that, in addition to the mandates of 
Rule 8(b), an affirmative defense is “affirmatively state[d]” in the answer.213  Rule 
8(a) governs complaints.214  Under Rule 8(a), plaintiffs must include in the complaint 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”215   
Some courts assert that different pleading standards are justified because 
Twombly and Iqbal focused on Rule 8(a)’s exclusive language.216  Rule 8(a) requires 
that a plaintiff plead allegations “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”217  
Neither Rule 8(b) nor Rule 8(c), the two subsections of Rule 8 that govern defenses, 
contain that same requirement.218  Thus, some courts maintain that factual specificity 
in pleading is only required when it is necessary to “show” that the party is “entitled 
to relief.”219  For these courts, applying the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses is not a logical extension of Twombly and Iqbal because the text of 
subsections (b) and (c) does not contain this language.220  Courts applying this 
approach find the text relating to defenses “markedly less demanding” than that of 
the language governing complaints.221 
                                                           
 211 Id. at 593.  
 212 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). 
 213 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 214 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 215 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
 216 See, e.g., Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 593; Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. No., 
CIV.A. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009) (refusing to apply the 
plausibility standard to defenses because “[t]here is no requirement under Rule 8(c) that a 
defendant ‘show’ any facts at all.”). 
 217 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
 218 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 219 Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 (D. Minn. 2010) 
(rejecting the plausibility standard for affirmative defenses because “neither Rule 8(a)(2) nor 
any other rule requires a defendant to plead facts ‘showing’ that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
relief) (emphasis in original); see also Powers v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., No. 1:09-CV-2059, 
2011 WL 3418290, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2011) (“As R. 8(c) does not require a defendant 
to show entitlement to relief, Iqbal and Twombly have no application to the pleading 
requirements of R. 8(c).”); von der Heydt, supra note 160, at 818 (“Twombly and Iqbal would 
be taken by many courts to alter the interpretation of Rule 8(a)(1) as well as Rule 8(a)(2).  
This extension of the doctrine, almost never explained, ignores the fact that (a)(1), unlike 
(a)(2), requires no ‘showing . . . .’”). 
 220 Wells Fargo & Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; see also Powers, 2011 WL 3418290, at 
*3; von der Heydt, supra note 160, at 818. 
 221 Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. Kan. 2011).  
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Limiting the plausibility standard to complaints is not fully supported by the text 
of the Federal Rules.  It can be inferred from the language of Rule 8 that the 
requirements for pleading affirmative defenses are the same as for pleading 
claims.222  Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses must meet the pleading dictates of Rule 
8(b)223  Both Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b) contain the same requirement that the pleader 
make a “short and plain” statement of the claims or defenses.224  Because this shared 
language is considered the “essence of the pleading standard,” it can be inferred that 
complaints and defenses were intended to meet the same pleading requirements—
including the plausibility standard.225 Considering the mutual language of Rules 8(a) 
and (b), and the requirement that Rule 8(c) meets the dictates of Rule 8(b), the 
Federal Rules textually support applying the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative 
defenses.   
In addition, case law and academic commentary set forth prior to the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions demonstrates that affirmative defenses were intended to meet the 
same pleading standard as complaints.  In 1999, the Fifth Circuit expressly 
concluded that affirmative defenses were subject to the same pleading requirements 
as the complaint.226  Some district courts prior to Twombly and Iqbal even asserted 
that “[t]he standard for striking an affirmative defense is the mirror image of the 
standard for considering whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”227  Similarly, 
academic commentators have remarked that “[t]he general rules of pleading that are 
applicable to the statement of a claim also govern the statement of affirmative 
defenses under Federal Rule 8(c).”228   
These examples of both case law and scholarly authority demonstrate that 
affirmative defenses and complaints were expected to be subjected to the same 
pleading standards.  Failing to apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative 
defenses directly contradicts this precedent.   
                                                           
 222 Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 223 United States v. Brink, CIV.A. C-10-243, 2011 WL 835828, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 
2011) (“[I]n pleading their affirmative defenses Defendants still must satisfy the requirement 
of Rule 8(b)(1) . . . .”). 
 224 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1); see also Barnes v. AT&T Pension 
Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Rule 8’s 
requirements with respect to pleading defenses in an answer parallels the Rules’s requirements 
for pleading claims in a complaint.”). 
 225 HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010); see also 
PageMelding, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., No. C 11-06263 WHA, 2012 WL 3877686, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 6, 2012) (“Affirmative defenses are governed by the same pleading standards as 
claims.”) 
 226 Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Heller Fin., Inc. v. 
Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining that “[a]ffirmative 
defenses are pleadings” and should be subject to “all pleading requirements of the Federal 
Rules . . . .”). 
 227 Solvent Chem. Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212 
(W.D.N.Y. 2002); see also FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02CV4786GBD, 2005 WL 
475986, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2005) (“A motion to strike an affirmative defense . . . is also 
governed by the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss . . . .”).  
 228 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1274. 
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Despite the formalistic concerns discussed, the Federal Rules, case law, and 
academic authority all support extending the Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative 
defenses. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Almost every answer received in federal courts contains a litany of affirmative 
defenses.229  Many of these affirmative defenses are mere conclusory allegations 
with no supporting factual details.230  Plaintiffs are typically left with the daunting 
task of attempting to determine which, if any, of these defenses have merit during 
the costly discovery process.231  Courts expend scarce judicial resources to “weed 
out” these boilerplate affirmative defenses.232   
The Supreme Court supplied the remedy to the affirmative defense plague in the 
form of the plausibility standard.233  Originally set forth in Twombly, and later 
clarified in Iqbal, the plausibility standard requires that allegations contained in 
pleadings are facially plausible.234  It is axiomatic that the commonly pled 
affirmative defense, supported with no factual specificity, does not meet this test. 
Twombly and Iqbal both centered on the pleading of complaints.235  For this 
reason, many courts refuse to apply the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses.236  These courts fail to recognize that the same pragmatic concerns 
underlying the adoption of plausibility pleading for complaints warrant extension of 
the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.237  Additionally, the text of the 
Twombly and Iqbal opinions, and the specific language used in Federal Rule 8, 
permits applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.238   
                                                           
 229 Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. CIVA 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“Defendants in this case, not unlike defendants in most answers 
received by this court, set forth a list of affirmative defenses to Plaintiff’s complaint.”).  
 230 Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (D. Minn. 2010) 
(“Affirmative defenses are almost always simply listed in answers; only rarely do defendants 
plead much in the way of facts in support of affirmative defenses.”). 
 231 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 232 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 233 See discussion supra Parts II.D.3-4.  
 234 See discussion supra Parts II.D.3-4. 
 235 See discussion supra Parts II.D.3-4. 
 236 See, e.g., Sewell v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 32209, at *7 
(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) (“Because Twombly and Iqbal do not expressly apply to defenses . . 
. this Court declines to do so.”); Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. CIVA 09-973, 
2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly was 
interpreting pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) . . . and declines to so extend the Supreme 
Court ruling as requested by the Plaintiff.”). 
 237 See discussion supra Parts III.D.1-3. 
 238 See discussion supra Parts III.E.1-2. 
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Meritless affirmative defenses are pled with abandon in federal courts.239  To 
limit this epidemic, and to provide equity between plaintiffs and defendants, federal 
courts should universally require affirmative defenses to meet the plausibility 
standard.   
 
                                                           
 239 See United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *6 (E.D. 
Mich. 2007) (asserting that there is “widespread abuse” of affirmative defenses); see also 
Romantine, 2009 WL 3417469 at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (“Defendant in this case, not 
unlike defendants in most answers received by this court, set forth a list of affirmative 
defenses to Plaintiff's complaint.”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(“[C]ounsel often plead vast numbers of affirmative defenses . . . .”).   
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/9
